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According to theory, choices relating to patience and self-control in domains as varied
as drug use and retirement saving are driven by generalized preferences about delayed
rewards. Past research has shown that measurements of these time preferences are
associated with these choices. Research has also attempted to examine how well such
measurements can predict choices, but only with inappropriate analytical methods.
Moreover, it is not clear which of the many kinds of time-preference tests that have
been proposed are most useful for prediction, and a theoretically important aspect of
time preferences, nonstationarity, has been neglected in measurement. In Study 1, we
examined three approaches to measuring time preferences with 181 users of Mechanical
Turk. Retest reliability, for both immediate and 1-month intervals, was decent, as was
convergent validity between tests, and association was similar to previous results, but
predictive accuracy for 10 criterion variables (e.g., tobacco use) was approximately nil.
In Study 2, we examined one other approach to measuring time preferences, and 40
criterion variables, using 7,127 participants in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1979. Time preferences were significantly related to criterion variables, but predictive
accuracy was again poor. Our findings imply serious problems for using time-preference
tests to predict real-world decisions. The results of Study 1 further suggest there is little
value in measuring nonstationarity separately from patience.
Keywords: decision making, intertemporal choice, self-control, retest reliability, predictive validity
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Measuring Time Preferences
People frequently need to choose between one outcome available soon (the smaller sooner, or SS,
option) and a more desirable outcome available later (the larger later, or LL, option). Deciding
whether to indulge in a dessert or stick to a diet, to splurge on an impulse buy or save up for
a more desirable item, and to relax or study for an upcoming exam, can all be characterized
as intertemporal choices. Intertemporal choice is often called “delay discounting,” because of
people’s and animals’ tendency to treat LL as less valuable the more it is delayed, which has
led to the development and popularization of quantitative models of intertemporal choice based
on multiplicative discount factors (Samuelson, 1937; Mazur, 1987; Rachlin et al., 1991). A long-
influential idea in the study of decision-making is that people have stable individual differences in
how they make intertemporal choices (Myerson and Green, 1995). In particular, it is theorized that
such time preferences are a key determinant of success in self-control dilemmas, such as attempting
to cease use of an addictive drug, because in such cases the individual must choose between the
SS reward of succumbing to temptation and the LL reward of keeping good habits (Kirby et al.,
1999). This thinking is supported by findings that measurements of time preferences are associated
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in expected directions with variables such as body mass index
(Sutter et al., 2010), credit-card debt (Meier and Sprenger, 2010),
and heroin addiction (Madden et al., 1997).
It is generally agreed that a high-quality standardized test
of a personality construct is important for research into
that construct. Actually, while time preferences have been
studied from such diverse perspectives as cognitive psychology,
economics, and psychiatry, they have not generally been regarded
as a personality construct (see Odum, 2011 for an exception).
And yet, time preferences have a rich underlying theory, they are
associated with many other variables, and individual differences
are stable over time, seemingly qualifying them as personality
constructs par excellence. Evidence of stability over time comes
from studies of retest reliability. Kirby (2009) found that
administrations separated by a year produced logged discount
rates correlated 0.71. Beck and Triplett (2009) found a correlation
of 0.64 after a 6-week interval. Meier and Sprenger (2015) found
that, collapsing across subjects, subjects made the same choice in
73% of pairs of identical trials offered a year apart.
Despite widespread interest in time preferences and use of
tests to measure them, there has been little agreement on which
tests to use. Instead, researchers have employed a wide variety
of tests. Some tests have subjects make binary choices (Rachlin
and Green, 1972; Kirby et al., 1999), whereas others have subjects
write in values that would make them indifferent between two
options (Kirby and Marakovic, 1995; Kimura et al., 2013). Some
tests consider only SS delays of 0, whereas other tests consider
scenarios in which SS as well as LL is delayed (Rachlin and
Green, 1972; McClure et al., 2004). Some tests give all subjects the
same items, whereas others use a variety of strategies to choose
items adaptively, hopefully yielding more reliable measurements
with fewer trials (Logan, 1965; Toubia et al., 2013; Koffarnus
and Bickel, 2014; Lu et al., 2014). Some tests have subjects make
decisions about hypothetical events, whereas others give subjects
real payments after real delays, whether those delays are on the
scale of days (Kirby and Marakovic, 1995; Read et al., 2012) or
of seconds between trials of a multiple-trial task (Rachlin and
Green, 1972; Reynolds and Schiffbauer, 2004; Johnson, 2012).
Finally, scoring procedures have varied from simple consistency
measures to maximum likelihood estimation (cf. Kirby, 2009;
Myerson et al., 2001; Zauberman et al., 2009).
Given this wide array of possibilities, what test of time
preferences should an investigator use? Past research has
examined various aspects of how time preferences are measured
(such as forced-choice vs. free-response formats), how these
measurement details affect the resulting scores, and how well
scores obtained from different tests agree (e.g., Smith and
Hantula, 2008; Weatherly and Derenne, 2011; Weatherly, 2014).
To our knowledge, however, no past work has examined how
such measurement details affect reliability or criterion validity.
Reliability and criterion validity are key determinants of how
useful a test will be in practice, and therefore should guide our
choice of test.
One way in which the many extant tests are similar, but
possibly deficient, is that all but a few of them measure only
patience, that is, people’s overall willingness to wait for rewards.
Patience is distinct from nonstationarity, which is how people’s
patience changes as the delays to both SS and LL increase in
equal measure. It is nonstationarity that is theoretically linked to
self-control (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Ariely and Wertenbroch,
2002); a person who is impatient but stationary, such as a person
who always says they prefer watching TV to exercising (rather
than first saying they prefer exercising and then changing their
mind when the time comes), is not thought of as lacking self-
control, but as generally preferring immediate gratification. A
self-control problem, then, is when people change their minds
from patient to impatient choices as a scenario draws closer.
Accommodation of nonstationarity is an important strength of
the hyperbolic delay-discounting model that is influential in
research on economic decision-making (Ainslie, 1975; Mazur,
1987; Ainslie, 2001). If the economic theory of time preferences’
effect on self-control is correct, measuring nonstationarity may
greatly increase a time-preference test’s criterion validity for
behavior related to self-control.
1.2. Association vs. Prediction
A statistical issue that is particularly important for criterion
validity and applied uses of tests is the distinction between
association and predictive accuracy. Typically, when
psychologists wish to quantify the relationship between
variables, they use a measure of how well values can be associated
with each other, such as a correlation coefficient, or how well a
model fits the data, such as root mean squared error (RMSE).
The question of predictive accuracy, by contrast, is how well
a model can estimate the value of a dependent variable (DV)
when the model does not already have access to that value. For
example, the predictive accuracy of a time-preference test might
signify how accurately the test can predict number of cigarettes
smoked among people whose smoking has not been measured.
Notice that the prediction in question is of individual data values
(e.g., the number of cigarettes smoked by subject 3) in numeric
terms (e.g., 7 cigarettes). Such predictions are distinct from what
is usually meant when a researcher states that a theory “predicts”
something: namely, ordinal effects such as “Less patient people
smoke more.” Prediction, in the statistical sense of the term, need
not be future-oriented: we can examine the predictive accuracy
of one variable for another variable measured at the same time,
or even before the predictor. What is important is not the timing
of measurements, but that the model is not trained with the very
same cases it is trying to predict.
This sort of criterion validity—predictive rather than
merely associative—is especially useful in applied contexts, for
assessment and decision-making. In such situations, tests are
used for their ability to inform us about what we do not already
know concerning the examinee. Test scores are used as tools
to estimate these other, unknown quantities. Hence, the more
accurate the test is in predicting the unknown quantities, the
more useful it will be for guiding our decisions.
Predictive accuracy can be quantified with some of the same
statistics as association, such as RMSE. However, association is
optimistically biased as a measure of predictive accuracy, due to
overfitting (Wasserman, 2004, Theorem 13.15; see also Arfer and
Luhmann, 2015). Measuring predictive accuracy while avoiding
this problem requires additional steps, such as cross-validation
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(Hastie et al., 2009, p. 228), which splits the data into parts
for separate model-fitting and model evaluation. Without cross-
validation or a similar technique, past studies on the criterion
validity of time-preference tests provide little information as to
how useful those tests would really be for predicting criterion
variables (CVs) that have not yet been measured. The general
problem of using a single dataset for both fitting a model
(training) and evaluating its performance (testing) at the same
time can be described as using the same data to train and
test.
Many past studies have claimed to find that a test of time
preferences, or at least a test of patience, can indeed predict
CVs. These are only a subset of the large literature showing
association between time preferences and CVs. But generally,
they have not used appropriate methods to assess and quantify
predictive accuracy, so they are not informative as to the
question of prediction, despite the intentions of the authors.
For example, Daugherty and Brase (2010) had college students
complete a forced-choice patience measure (that of Kirby and
Marakovic, 1996) and questions about health behavior, such as
the use of tobacco and the frequency of dentist visits. They
make the claim that patience (as well as other variables) predicts
some of the health behaviors on the basis of (a) significant
changes in R2 from hierarchical regression and (b) standardized
regression coefficients that significantly differ from 0. But the
R2 values were calculated using the same data to train and
test. And regression coefficients are a distinct question from
predictive accuracy: regression coefficients are only the best-
fitting parameter values of a given model with a given fitting
algorithm, and do not measure whether the model as a whole
is predictively accurate, neither with those parameter values nor
with different values. Finally, statistical significance is distinct
from how accurate a model is at prediction. There are three
ways p-values and the significance thereof fail to measure
predictive accuracy. First, as discussed earlier, they do not
separate training from testing. Second, p-values are not in units
of the DV (e.g., number of cigarettes smoked). Third, even
if predictive accuracy is held constant, $p$-values shrink as
the sample size increases. These problems for the use of p-
values for evaluating predictive accuracy are in addition to more
general problems with p-values (e.g., Cohen, 1994; Cumming,
2014).
1.3. The Present Studies
The present studies sought to provide direct insight on the
question of how to measure time preferences and how well
tests of time preferences can predict CVs. Study 1 compared
three families of time-preference tests on reliability, convergent
validity, and ability to predict 10 self-reported CVs, ranging from
overweight to credit-card debt. Subjects were 181 US residents
recruited from the crowdsourcing website Amazon Mechanical
Turk. Study 2 examined the predictive accuracy of another test
of time preferences for 40 self-reported CVs, which covered
many of the same content areas, as well as new areas such as flu
vaccination and age of sexual debut. Subjects were thousands of
people from the nationally representative National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth 1979.
2. STUDY 1
To help answer the question of how best to measure time
preferences, rather than manipulate a few administration details,
we compared three representative families of time-preference
tests. One family used the popular items of Kirby et al. (1999).
This family is representative of the general practice of measuring
time preferences with forced binary choices between SS and LL
(Logan, 1965), and the particular items of Kirby et al. (1999)
have appeared in many other studies since (e.g., Chabris et al.,
2008; Kirby, 2009; Brody et al., 2014). Another family used
an adaptive forced-choice procedure, the probabilistic bisection
algorithm. This is a statistically sophisticated equivalent of
stepwise procedures that attempt to home in on the subject’s true
preference (e.g., Mazur, 1987; Koffarnus and Bickel, 2014). The
final family had subjects fill in a blank with an amount of money
that would make them indifferent between two options. Such
tests, which attempt to estimate points of indifference directly, are
the most common kind of free-response econometric test (e.g.,
Kirby and Marakovic, 1995; Kimura et al., 2013). Importantly,
each of the three families comprised two tests that allowed us to
measure patience as well as nonstationarity.
We evaluated the preference tests on their retest reliability,
their convergent validity, their association with a number of
practically important CVs, and, crucially, their accuracy at
predicting said CVs. In fact, we used predictive rather than
associative methods for retest reliability and convergent validity
as well as for criterion validity. We administered the preference
tests three times, with the third administration separated from
the first two by 1 month, allowing us to estimate retest reliability
over immediate as well as 1-month intervals.
2.1. Method
The procedure was approved by the Stony Brook University
Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects. All
subjects provided informed consent. The committee waived the
requirement for documentation of informed consent, since the
study was conducted on Mechanical Turk.
2.1.1. Preference Tests
Subjects completed three families of tests of time preferences.
Each family used a different approach to measure the same two
theoretical constructs, patience (i.e., willingness to wait for larger
rewards) and nonstationarity (i.e., the effect of front-end delays
on willingness to wait). Each family comprised two very similar
tests (for a total of six distinct tests), which differed only in
whether a front-end delay of 1month was added to all the options
presented to subjects. Tests with this delay are termed the far
tests, whereas tests without it are termed the near tests. In theory,
the near and far tests alone each measure patience, whereas the
difference between subjects’ behavior in the near and far tests
measures nonstationarity.
The first family, which we call the fixed tests, used the
medium-magnitude items of Kirby et al. (1999). In 7 trials,
subjects made a forced choice between an SS reward and an LL
reward. The SS delays were always “today” in the near fixed test
and “30 days” in the far fixed test. The LL delays were the same
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as in Kirby et al. for the near test but were incremented by 30
days for the far test. We scored each test similarly to Kirby et al.
but with a less model-specific metric. Specifically, we represented
each item by its rank in terms of discount rate of indifference
(such that $54 vs. $55 was item 1, $47 vs. $50 was item 2, etc.)
and computed for each subject the most consistent rank rather
than themost consistent discount rate.We then doubled the rank
scores and subtracted 2 to put the scores on a scale of 0 to 20 with
all but a few subjects receiving integer scores.
We designed the second family, of bisection tests, to adaptively
estimate each subject’s 1-month discount factor; that is, the
number d ∈ [0, 1] such that dx dollars delivered at one time is
worth to the subject x dollars delivered 1 month later. Adaption
was accomplished using the probabilistic bisection algorithm
(Horstein, 1963; our implementation was based on Waeber,
2013, p. 14), which repeatedly queries at the posterior median
(estimated in Bayesian fashion) of an unknown parameter. We
set the tuning parameter pc, which represents the probability
of the queried system giving the correct signal (i.e., the subject
choosing the option that they on average prefer), to 3/4. In each of
20 trials, subjects chose between an LL reward randomly selected
from $15, $16, . . . , $95, and an SS reward chosen to make a
subject with the current estimate of the discount factor indifferent
between SS and LL, rounded to the nearest dollar. Delays were
“today” and “1 month” for the near test and “1 month” and “2
months” for the far test. The score for each test was the final value
of the posterior median of the discount factor, on the original
[0, 1] scale.
Finally, the family of matching tests used a free-response
rather than a forced-choice format. In each of 10 trials, the SS
reward amount was randomly selected from $1, $2, . . . , $95 and
the subject was asked to “fill in the blank [viz., the LL amount]
with an amount that makes the two options equally appealing
to you; that is, an amount that makes you indifferent between
the two options.” Subjects could enter amounts with up to 1-cent
precision. As in the case of the bisection tests, delays were “today”
and “1month” for the near test and “1month” and “2months” for
the far test. These tests were scored simply by taking the median
of the SS amounts divided by the LL amounts, yielding again a
discount factor on the scale of [0, 1].
Notice that all tests were scored in the direction with greater
scores implying greater patience. Notice also that these scores,
which we used for all analyses below, are not the same as model-
specific measures common in the study of intertemporal choice
such as the discount rate k1. The goal of this study was not to
evaluate any one of the many models of intertemporal choice
that have been proposed (Doyle, 2013); our focus was on tests
rather than models. We have previously found evidence that a
wide variety of models can successfully predict responses in a
pure intertemporal-choice task (Arfer and Luhmann, 2015), but
1We also generated Tables 2, 3 with each test represented not by its raw score,
as described in this section, but by the natural logarithm of a discounting-rate
parameter k obtained by fitting the data from each test administration to a model
of hyperbolic discounting. Accuracy for predicting CVs was substantially similar.
Immediate retest reliability was similar for the fixed and matching tests, but
substantively reduced for the bisection tests.
in that study, we did not try to predict other kinds of behavior,
and prediction was within rather than between subjects.
To check that the selected numbers of trials for the bisection
and matching families were adequate, we ran pilot studies in
which we administered both tests in each family twice, to 14
users of Mechanical Turk per family. We examined the difference
between the discount factors yielded by the first and second
administration for each test. For the two families, 75 and 83%
of differences, respectively, were less than 0.1 (on the scale of
discount factors, from 0 to 1), which we judged to be adequate.
2.1.2. Criterion Questionnaire
Subjects self-reported about a wide variety of real-world
behaviors that are in theory related to patience and self-control,
as well as their demographics. Chabris et al. (2008) was our
primary inspiration in choosing and writing questions. Questions
were asked of subjects in the order shown here. The response
format for each question is described after the question in square
brackets.
• Are you male or female? [“Male” or “Female”]
• How old are you? [Integer]
• How tall are you? [Length, US or SI units]
• How much do you weigh? [Weight, US or SI units]
• Do you use tobacco? [“Yes” or “No”]
[Shown only if the subject answered “Yes”] How many
packs of cigarettes do you smoke per week? (Enter 0 if
you don’t smoke cigarettes.) [Integer]
• How many hours per week are you physically active (for
example, working out)? [Integer]
• For how many of your meals do you choose the amount
or kind of food you eat with health or fitness concerns in
mind? [Percentage]
• Howmany times per week do you use dental floss? [Integer]
• Have you used a credit card at all in the past 2 years? [“Yes”
or “No”]
[Shown only if the subject answered “Yes”] Over the
past 2 years, how many times were you charged a late
fee for making a credit card payment after the deadline?
[Integer]
[Shown only if the subject answered “Yes”] Over the past
2 years, howmany of your credit-card payments were for
less than your total balance? [Percentage]
• Over the past 2 years, how much of your income have you
saved? (Please include savings into retirement plans and
any other form of savings that you do.) [Percentage]
• On how many days per month do you gamble? (Gambling
includes such activities as playing at casinos, playing cards
for stakes, buying lottery tickets, and betting on sports.)
[Integer]
The theoretical relationship of the CVs to time preferences,
and thus self-control, is that each is related to choices between
small rewards available soon and larger rewards available later.
For example, smoking entails getting the immediate pleasure
of a cigarette and forgoing the long-term health benefits of
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not smoking. Overweight is related to overeating, which again
entails getting immediate pleasure and forgoing long-term
health benefits. And credit-card debt is accumulated by making
immediate purchases with the effect of having to pay much more
than the original purchase price over the long term. No variable
is supposed to be caused by self-control alone, but each involves
self-control partly.
2.1.3. Subjects
Subjects were recruited from the crowdsourcing website Amazon
Mechanical Turk. They were required to live in the United States.
Of the 200 subjects who participated in session 1, 74 (37%) were
female, and the median age was 31 (95% sample interval 19–
64). All 200 were invited to complete session 2, and 103 did so.
Subjects provided informed consent before each session. They
were compensated with $1 for completing session 1 (median
completion time 15min) and $0.50 for completing session 2
(median completion time 6min).
2.1.4. Procedure
Session 1 took place from February 15th to 21st, 2014. In session
1, subjects completed all six preference tests in a random order
(round 1), then did so again in another random order (round 2),
with no delay in between or notification that the same tests were
applied twice. (The order of tests was randomized per subject.)
Finally, subjects completed the criterion questionnaire.
Without prior warning, subjects were invited to participate
in session 2 by email approximately 30 days later. To balance
server load, invitations were sent out in 5 batches of 10 per day
starting on March 18th, 2014, so all participants in session 1 had
been invited back by March 22nd. Subjects had until March 25th
to complete session 2. This session consisted entirely of a third
administration of the six preference tests, again in random order
(round 3).
As an extra check on subject attention, we included in each
bisection test two catch trials. In one catch trial, the ratio of
amounts (SS amount divided by LL amount) was set to 0.07,
making LL clearly preferential for all but the most impatient of
subjects. In the other catch trial, the ratio of amounts was set to
1.13, making one option have both the lesser delay and the greater
amount, giving subjects with no clear justification to prefer the
other option. Choices in these trials were not used for scoring
any tests.
2.2. Results and Discussion
The raw data for both Study 1 and Study 2, as well as task
code and analysis code, can be found at http://arfer.net/projects/
rickrack.
Of the 200 subjects who participated in session 1, we excluded
from analysis 4 subjects who gave a nonsensical answer to a
question in the criterion questionnaire, 10 subjects who took
the designated incorrect choice in at least 3 of the 8 catch trials
in session 1, and 6 subjects who gave an LL response smaller
than SS in at least 3 of the 40 matching trials in session 1. (No
subjects made 3 or more errors in either category in session 2.)
Accounting for overlap in these groups, 181 subjects remained.
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics for preference-test scores in round 1.
Matching Fixed Bisection
Near Far Near Far Near Far
Q3 11 11 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.84
Median 9 9 0.76 0.77 0.69 0.66
Q1 7 5 0.59 0.58 0.50 0.50
MAD 2 2 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.16
Q3, top quartile; Q1, bottom quartile; MAD, median absolute deviation from the median.
These 181 subjects constitute the sample for the bulk of the
following analyses.
Of the 103 subjects who participated in both sessions, 7
were already excluded by the above rules, and we excluded an
additional 3 subjects who completed session 2 in less than 3 min,
for a final sample size of 93. This smaller sample of 93 is used only
for the 1-month retest reliability analysis (the right-hand half of
Table 3), since this is the only analysis using data from round 3
(i.e., session 2)2.
Descriptive statistics for preference-test scores in round 1 are
shown in Table 1. The median completion time for session 1 was
15 min, and the median completion time for session 2 was 6 min.
We transformed and coded the CVs as follows, based
on inspection of their distributions (without reference to the
preference tests), so as to retain variability while maximizing
their suitability as a DV for linear regression, dichotomous probit
regression, or ordinal probit regression.
• Hours of exercise per week was incremented by 1 and
log-transformed.
• Healthy meals and savings were clipped to [0.005, 0.995]
and logit-transformed.
• Overweight was calculated by computing body mass index
(as weight in kilograms divided by the square of height in
meters), then dichotomizing using a threshold of 25.
• Gambling, credit-card late fees, and credit-card
subpayments were dichotomized according to whether the
subject’s answer was greater than 0.
• Number of cigarettes smoked was ignored in favor of the
dichotomous variable of whether the subject used tobacco.
• Flossing was coded into three ordered categories: 0 (less
than once per week), 1–6 (less than once per day), and 7
or more (once or more per day).
2.2.1. Association with Criterion Variables
For each CV and family of preference tests, we assessed how
well the preference tests (administered in round 1) could account
for variation in the CV with a regression model. Each model
had four terms: an intercept, main effects for the near and
far test scores, and an interaction. The model was an ordinary
2We regenerated all the tables for Study 1 in this paper using all 200 subjects
(i.e., without any exclusion criteria, except of course that we could not assess
1-month retest reliability among subjects who did not return for session 2). We
also regenerated Tables 2, 3 with stricter exclusion criteria, in which subjects who
fell for even one catch trial or gave even one LL response smaller than SS were
excluded, yielding a sample size of 137. All these results were substantially similar
to those reported in the tables shown here.
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linear regression model for the continuous CVs (exercise, healthy
meals, and savings), a dichotomous probit regression model for
the dichotomous CVs (overweight, tobacco, gambling, credit-
card late fees, and credit-card subpayment), and an ordinal probit
regression model for flossing. Models with a CV related to credit
cards included only subjects who stated they had used a credit
card in the past 2 years.
Measures of model fit are shown under “Association” in
Table 2. These values of R2 and Efron’s R2 are small, but similar
to those obtained by Chabris et al. (2008). The bisection tests
achieve the greatest fit for 7 of the 9 CVs.
2.2.2. Prediction of Criterion Variables
In the previous section, we assessed the association of preference
tests with CVs. Here, by contrast, we assess how accurately the
tests could predict unseen data. To do this, we subjected the same
models just described to tenfold cross-validation. The results are
shown under “Predictive accuracy” in Table 2. Observe that none
of the models performed above baseline. For the discrete CVs,
none of themodels had a higher proportion of correct predictions
than the base rate of the modal class. For the continuous CVs,
in only one case was the RMSE less than the standard deviation
of the CV, and in that one case (of the bisection tests predicting
exercise), the improvement was tiny. Thus, these preference tests
appear to be of limited value for predicting these CVs.
We reasoned that if there really existed a predictively useful
relationship between the preference tests and CVs, perhaps it
was too complex to be exploited by these models. We thus
tried several more complex procedures: k-nearest neighbors
classification and support vector machines for the discrete CVs,
locally linear kernel regression for the continuous CVs, and
random forests for all CVs. Like the simpler regression models,
these procedures at best barely improved upon baseline. We omit
further details for space.
2.2.3. Retest Reliability
The notion of reliability most closely related to predictive
criterion validity is a test’s accuracy in predicting itself. We
therefore assessed the retest reliability of our preference tests by
assessing how well scores in round 1 predicted scores in rounds 2
and 3. We attempted to predict round-2 and round-3 scores with
unaltered round-1 scores rather than using a statistical model,
since the question is how stable the scores are on their own. By
contrast, Pearson correlations, for example, do not penalize bias.
A convenience of this approach is that cross-validation is not
necessary for estimating predictive accuracy, because there is no
model to train.
Our three rounds of preference testing in two sessions allowed
for estimating retest reliability over two intervals, immediately
and 1 month (Table 3). We calculated bias as the mean difference
between the target score and the predictor score. In our
judgment, these are moderate to high degrees of reliability.
Subjects’ scores did not change much either immediately or over
the course of a month, with median absolute errors around
0.05 for the bisection and matching tests. Bias for all tests was
low. As for between-test differences in reliability, the only clear
difference these findings suggest is that the matching tests had
greater immediate retest reliability than the other two families,
and this may be an artifact of how it is easier to remember and
reuse a response strategy for this family than for the other two.
But also recall that in the fixed family, unlike the bisection and
matching families, every administration of the same test presents
the same items. This means that reliability estimates for the fixed
family, particularly over the immediate interval, may be inflated
by subjects remembering and reusing their past answers.
Table 3 also includes Pearson correlations, in spite of the
foregoing discussion, for the sake of comparability with past
studies. These are around 0.8 for both intervals, which is
similar to past studies of intertemporal-choice tests and compares
favorably to personality tests in general (Schuerger et al., 1982).
2.2.4. Convergent Validity
If our tests could predict themselves but not external CVs, could
they predict each other? We estimated convergent validity by
examining mutual prediction in round 1 with tenfold cross-
validated linear regression (clipping predictions to the legal
range of the DV). We found moderate convergent validity, with
proportions of variance accounted for (PVAF) ranging from 0.25
to 0.50. These figures are comparable to those of Smith and
TABLE 2 | Results for assocation and prediction between each family of preference test and criterion variable (CV).
Continuous Discrete
Exercise Healthy meals Savings Overweight Tobacco use Gambling Flossing CC late fees CC subpayment
ASSOCIATION
Fixed 0.026 0.037 0.004 0.005 0.019 0.025 0.009 0.025 0.012
Bisection 0.084 0.054 0.025 0.002 0.035 0.055 0.004 0.033 0.013
Matching 0.035 0.040 0.013 0.001 0.003 0.040 0.009 0.015 0.038
Baseline 6.880 0.335 0.170 0.560 0.760 0.830 0.360 0.750 0.600
PREDICTIVE ACCURACY
Fixed 7.110 0.348 0.188 0.490 0.750 0.820 0.350 0.730 0.570
Bisection 6.770 0.352 0.186 0.520 0.760 0.820 0.280 0.740 0.540
Matching 7.150 0.360 0.188 0.560 0.760 0.820 0.330 0.740 0.580
Association is measured with R2 for continuous CVs and Efron’s R2 for discrete CVs. The baseline measure is standard deviation for continuous CVs and the base rate of the modal
class for discrete CVs. Predictive accuracy is measured with root mean squared error for continuous CVs and proportion agreement for discrete CVs. CC, credit card.
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TABLE 3 | Accuracy of round-1 preference tests used to predict scores on the same tests in round 2 (immediately after round 1 in session 1) and round 3
(in session 2, a month after session 1).
Predicting round 2 Predicting round 3
Fixed Bisection Matching Fixed Bisection Matching
Near Far Near Far Near Far Near Far Near Far Near Far
PVAF 0.70 0.49 0.51 0.62 0.75 0.82 0.44 0.57 0.44 0.64 0.57 0.56
Abs err, median 2.00 2.00 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 2.00 2.00 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05
Abs err, 90th %ile 5.00 7.00 0.23 0.18 0.14 0.13 5.00 5.00 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.21
Abs err, 95th %ile 5.00 9.00 0.28 0.24 0.20 0.18 7.00 6.00 0.21 0.23 0.28 0.26
Bias 0.10 0.09 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.37 −0.29 0.01 0.01 −0.02 −0.02
Kendall τ 0.71 0.61 0.65 0.63 0.74 0.78 0.66 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.65 0.62
Pearson r 0.85 0.72 0.76 0.81 0.88 0.91 0.77 0.80 0.72 0.82 0.81 0.79
PVAF, proportion of variance accounted for; Abs err, absolute error.
TABLE 4 | Counts of subjects exhibiting each kind of nonstationarity on
each family of preference tests in round 1.
Fixed Bisection Matching
Less patient later 75 95 100
Stationary 64 0 10
More patient later 42 86 71
Hantula (2008), who found that free-response and forced-choice
patience tests were correlated 0.33 (PVAF 0.11) in area under the
curve and 0.75 (PVAF 0.56) in discount rate. Generally, however,
these figures are substantially lower than the corresponding
immediate retest reliabilities. Therefore, as would be expected,
the tests can predict one another to some degree but also have
individual components of variance. The different families are
measuring similar but not identical constructs.
2.2.5. Nonstationarity
Descriptively, what nonstationarity did subjects exhibit in
their responses to the preference tests? Table 4 examines
nonstationarity in round 1 by comparing subjects’ near scores
and far scores for each test. Greater scores (more patience) on
the far test than the near test indicate classical nonstationarity,
in which the agent plans to be more patient in the future than
the present, whereas the reverse indicates the less theoretically
appealing phenomenon of planning to be less patient in the future
than the present, and equal scores on both tests indicate perfect
stationarity. (Perfect stationarity necessarily appears more often
for the fixed family than the other two because of its discrete
scoring scheme.) As can be seen in the table, there was no overall
trend in any of the three families for subjects to plan to be more
patient later. If anything, subjects tended to plan to be less patient
later. These findings are contrary to theory that requires decision-
makers to be more patient in the far test, but consistent with
past reports that have found no strong trend in either direction
(Ahlbrecht and Weber, 1997; Read, 2001; Kable and Glimcher,
2010).
To examine whether the presence of the front-end delay
could make a difference for prediction, we conducted an analysis
TABLE 5 | Accuracy of round-1 near tests used to predict scores on
round-2 far tests.
Fixed Bisection Matching
PVAF 0.47 0.42 0.68
Abs err, median 2.00 0.05 0.04
Abs err, 90th %ile 7.00 0.22 0.17
Abs err, 95th %ile 9.00 0.31 0.23
Bias 0.46 −0.02 −0.01
Kendall τ 0.58 0.60 0.73
Pearson r 0.70 0.75 0.86
PVAF, proportion of variance accounted for; Abs err, absolute error.
similar to the reliability analyses described earlier with round-
1 near scores as the predictor and round-2 far scores as the
DV. The results (Table 5) are similar to the prediction of the
same DV (round-2 far) with round-1 far (Table 3) rather than
round-1 near, particularly in terms of Kendall τ s. This implies
that scores on near tests can predict scores on far tests roughly
as well as they can predict themselves. This in turn suggests
that there is no special predictive value in using the separate
near and far tests; one might as well use twice as many trials
of a near test and get the same predictive ability for any CV of
interest.
3. STUDY 2
In Study 1, none of our tests of time preferences could predict
any of the CVs with more than trivial accuracy. The findings for
retest reliability and convergent validity support the quality of
the time-preference tests. For the CVs, however, we do not have
this psychometric information, raising the possibility that the low
predictive accuracy resulted from something unusual or deficient
about the 10 items we happened to use, which were based heavily
on the items of Chabris et al. (2008). In Study 2, we analyzed a
large public dataset with a much larger number and variety of
CVs. The data of Study 2 has the additional benefit of using in-
person interviews rather than Internet questionnaires, perhaps
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 February 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 150
Arfer and Luhmann Time-Preference Tests Fail to Predict
motivating subjects to answer questions more seriously and
thoughtfully.
3.1. Method
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79;
http://nlsinfo.org) is a project by the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics, in which people in a nationally representative sample
of Americans born between 1957 and 1964 are periodically
interviewed. Questions asked of subjects have differed over
the 25 interview rounds. The 2006 interview (and no others
for which data is yet available), at which time subjects were
ages 41–50, included two questions intended to measure time
preferences, particularly patience: IMPATIENCE_1 (reference
number T09617.00) and IMPATIENCE_2 (reference number
T09620.00). The first of these asked:
Suppose you have won a prize of $1000, which you can claim
immediately. However, you can choose to wait 1 month to claim
the prize. If you dowait, you will receivemore than $1000.What is
the smallest amount of money in addition to the $1000 you would
have to receive 1 month from now to convince you to wait rather
than claim the prize now?
The second item was the same except with an interval of 1 year
instead of 1 month. Subjects could answer with any nonnegative
integer. In theory, greater responses indicate less patience, and as
in Study 1, a comparison of responses between the two timepoints
should capture nonstationarity. Of 7,649 subjects interviewed,
7,127 provided a valid response to both questions. The remainder,
who refused to answer one of the two questions or said they did
not know, were given follow-up questions asking them to provide
a range estimate. It was not clear to us how to use range estimates
alongside the usual responses, and relatively few subjects (less
than 30 for each of the month and year scenarios) provided a
range estimate, so we restricted our analyses to the 7,127 subjects
who answered the month and year questions with integers. To
remain neutral on the question of how to model intertemporal
choice itself (as in Study 1), we used the responses directly rather
than fitting them to a model of intertemporal choice such as
hyperbolic discounting.
Of these 7,127 subjects, 51% were female. Regarding race,
52% were white, 30% were black, 19% were Hispanic, and 1%
were Asian (subjects could endorse more than one category).
The median net family income (which we also use as a CV) was
$54,975. Among the 93% of subjects who the surveyors could
determine as living in a rural area or an urban area in 2006, 29%
lived in a rural area.
For CVs, we searched the NLSY79 for items concerning real-
world self-control, covering both the domains considered in
Study 1 (obesity, exercise, drug use, healthy eating, oral hygiene,
debt, and saving; we found no items concerning overall gambling
behavior) and new domains (sleep, health insurance, vaccination,
sexual debut, divorce, crime, and income). This search produced
a list of 1,034 items, some of which were the same question
asked in different years or were otherwise indistinct from other
items, and some of which were not asked of any subjects who
answered the patience items. Below, we describe the 40 variables
we produced from these items. When items were available for
multiple years, we preferred years closer to 2006 (the year the
patience questions were asked), breaking ties in favor of years
after rather than before 2006.
3.2. Results and Discussion
As in Study 1, we transformed and coded the CVs based
on inspection of their distributions (without reference to the
preference tests) so as to retain variability while maximizing their
suitability as DVs. Table 6 reviews the 40 CVs we produced; see
the NLSY79 documentation for details of the original survey
questions. In our analyses, we included only cases that were
missing on neither the predictors nor the CV. The resulting
sample sizes were still large, ranging from 3,100 to 7,127 (median
6,767).
To ensure we replicated past studies’ findings of significant
association between CVs and patience, we ran Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests for the binary CVs (treating patience as the DV
rather than as the predictor, as is usual in this literature) and
Kendall correlation tests for the continuous CVs. We chose
nonparametric tests so any monotonic relationship could be
detected, regardless of scaling. Two tests were run for each CV,
one for month patience and one for year patience. We found
that of the 64 tests for the binary CVs, 47 were significant
(34 after a Holm-Bonferroni correction was applied for 64
comparisons), and of the 16 tests for the continuous CVs, 5
were significant (all of which remained significant after a Holm-
Bonferroni correction for 16 comparisons). Exactly which tests
were significant is indicated by superscripts in Tables 7, 8. What
is important is that, as in past studies, we were able to find many
significant associations between CVs and time preferences.
As in Study 1, we examined the strength of association of time
preferences with each CV and also the accuracy with which time
preferences could predict CVs. Table 7 shows our results for the
32 binary CVs. We considered two models. The log model was a
probit-regression model with 9 terms: an intercept, main effects
for the logarithms of responses to the month and year patience
items, dummy variables indicating responses of 0 to the month
and year patience items, and all nontrivial one-way interactions.
The nominal model treated every distinct pair of responses to the
patience items as a class (i.e., one level of a nominal variable), with
the exception that all singleton response pairs (response pairs that
only one subject made) were unified into one class. There were
746 unique response pairs among the 7,127 subjects, of which
392 were singletons, for a total of 355 classes. The nominal model
then predicted the CV by using whatever value of the CV was
most common for that class in the training data, breaking ties
by choosing the most common value in all the training data.
The nominal model is thus essentially the most flexible model
possible using these predictor variables. (We also examined two
other models, a 3-termmodel with untransformed patience items
and random forests. These generally performed worse than the
log model, and are omitted for space).
As can be seen in Table 7, for the log model, both association
and predictive accuracy were small. The association beats the base
rate by 5 percentile points for having a retirement account (57 vs.
52%), and by 3 percentile points for checking nutrition often (54
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TABLE 6 | The criterion variables used in Study 2.
n Year Scale Description
Difficult to run mile 4,932 XRND Binary S said they could not or did not run a mile, or that it was very difficult
Not easy to climb stairs 4,995 XRND Binary S rated climbing stairs as more difficult than “Not at all difficult”
Overweight 6,923 2006 Binary Body mass index 25 or more
Exercise, light, ever 6,789 2006 Binary S reported nonzero frequency of light or moderate exercise
Exercise, light, min/y 5,012 2006 Continuous (log) Calculated minutes per year of light or moderate exercise (nonzero only)
Exercise, vigorous, ever 6,855 2006 Binary S reported nonzero frequency of vigorous exercise
Exercise, vigorous, min/y 4,667 2006 Continuous (log) Calculated minutes per year of vigorous exercise (nonzero only)
Exercise, strength, ever 7,097 2006 Binary S reported nonzero frequency of strength training
Checks nutrition often 7,053 2006 Binary S “often” or “always” reads nutritional info while shopping
Eats fast food 6,858 2008 Binary S ate fast food at least once in past week
Drinks soft drinks 6,850 2008 Binary S drank a (non-diet) soft drink at least once in past week
Sleep min, weekday 4,997 XRND Continuous Minutes of sleep S usually gets on weekdays
Sleep min, weekend 4,994 XRND Continuous Minutes of sleep S usually gets on weekends
Health insurance 7,123 2006 Binary S has health insurance
Flu vaccine 6,852 1979 Binary S received flu vaccine in past 2 years
Sees dentist 6,856 1979 Binary S saw a dentist in past 2 years
Brushes teeth 2/day 6,551 2008 Binary S brushes teeth twice daily
Flosses daily 6,544 2008 Binary S flosses daily
Smoked 100 cigs 6,855 2008 Binary S smoked 100 cigarettes in lifetime
Smoking 6,856 2008 Binary S smokes “occasionally” or “daily”
Drinking 7,052 2006 Binary S drank alcohol in past month
Drinking, heavy 7,045 2006 Binary S drank more than 6 drinks in one occasion in past month
Drinks in last month 3,691 2006 Continuous (log) Calculated number of drinks in past month (nonzero only)
Cannabis 6,662 1998 Binary S ever used cannabis
Cocaine 6,690 1998 Binary S ever used cocaine
Stimulants 6,711 1998 Binary S ever used stimulants recreationally
Other drugs 6,694 1980 Binary S ever used illegal drugs (other than cannabis)
Sexual debut 6,563 1979 Continuous Age S first had “sexual intercourse”
Divorced 7,127 XRND Binary S ever divorced or separated
Stopped by police 6,907 1980 Binary S ever stopped by police (other than for minor traffic violation)
Convicted 6,910 1980 Binary S ever convicted (other than for minor traffic violation)
Net family income 6,748 2006 Continuous (sqrt) Calculated net family income in previous calendar year (top-coded)
Saving 6,618 2000 Binary S or partner has money in bank account or US savings bonds
Retirement account 6,599 2000 Binary S or partner has money in IRA, Keogh, 401(k), etc.
Missed bill payment 6,831 2008 Binary S missed or was 2 months late to a bill in past 5 years
CC debt, any 6,609 2008 Binary S or partner had nonzero CC balance after most recent payment
CC debt, dollars 3,100 2008 Continuous (log) Dollars of credit-card debt (nonzero only)
CC maxed out 6,775 2008 Binary S or partner has a maxed-out credit card
Debt to businesses 6,811 2008 Binary S or partner in debt to a store, hospital, bank, etc.
Negative net worth 6,759 2008 Binary S’s liabilities exceed S’s assets
“n” is the number of non-missing cases. “Year” shows the survey year in which the corresponding questions were asked; “XRND” means that questions from multiple survey years were
used (some health questions were only asked of subjects once they reached age 50, so we used the available assessment for each subject whichever year it was asked on, and our
divorce item is inferred from assessments of marital status that were made repeatedly from 1979 to 2012). “Scale” indicates whether the variable is binary or continuous, and if it is
continuous, what transformation, if any, was applied before fitting models. S, subject; CC, credit card.
vs. 51%); the remaining differences are below 2 percentile points.
In fact, for six CVs, the association does not quite attain the
base rate. Predictive accuracy is similar for having a retirement
account (57%) and checking nutrition often (54%), but otherwise
does not exceed the base rate by as much as 1 percentile point,
and goes below the base rate for 16 CVs. Association is somewhat
better for the more flexible nominal model, reaching a height
of 61% agreement for having a retirement account. Predictive
accuracy, however, is worse than that of the log model for all but
two CVs, and the improvements for these two are each less than
1 percentile point. In short, the nominal model seems to overfit.
Table 8 shows our results for the 8 continuous CVs. We have
performed the analysis in terms of absolute error rather than
squared error so that extreme values of the CVs, of which there
are several, are not weighted heavily. Thus, our baseline statistic
is mean absolute deviation from the median (MAD) rather than
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TABLE 7 | Results for binary criterion variables in Study 2.
Base rate Log model Nominal model
Efron’s R2 PA, a. PA, p. Efron’s R2 PA, a. PA, p.
Difficult to run milem, y 0.524 0.005 0.538 0.527 0.064 0.574 0.491
Not easy to climb stairsmm, y 0.604 0.008 0.603 0.602 0.071 0.629 0.581
Overweightmm, yy 0.717 0.004 0.717 0.716 0.048 0.723 0.705
Exercise, light, evermm 0.738 0.013 0.738 0.738 0.073 0.746 0.729
Exercise, vigorous, evermm, y 0.681 0.011 0.682 0.682 0.069 0.692 0.668
Exercise, strength, evermm, y 0.628 0.009 0.627 0.625 0.062 0.646 0.607
Checks nutrition oftenmm, yy 0.514 0.010 0.539 0.539 0.060 0.579 0.524
Eats fast foodmm, y 0.646 0.004 0.646 0.646 0.054 0.660 0.632
Drinks soft drinksmm, yy 0.579 0.010 0.580 0.579 0.065 0.613 0.577
Health insurancemm, yy 0.810 0.020 0.810 0.810 0.075 0.814 0.804
Flu vaccinem, y 0.681 0.003 0.681 0.681 0.052 0.691 0.662
Sees dentistmm, yy 0.668 0.021 0.670 0.668 0.073 0.681 0.652
Brushes teeth 2/day 0.741 0.001 0.741 0.740 0.058 0.748 0.732
Flosses daily 0.599 0.001 0.599 0.599 0.046 0.616 0.569
Smoked 100 cigsm, y 0.575 0.006 0.576 0.574 0.060 0.605 0.554
Smokingmm, yy 0.728 0.009 0.727 0.727 0.064 0.736 0.717
Drinkingmm, yy 0.527 0.009 0.541 0.538 0.070 0.594 0.545
Drinking, heavy 0.859 0.000 0.859 0.859 0.051 0.860 0.850
Cannabismm 0.617 0.004 0.617 0.616 0.055 0.638 0.605
Cocaine 0.767 0.003 0.767 0.767 0.052 0.771 0.749
Stimulantsmm 0.887 0.005 0.887 0.887 0.058 0.889 0.882
Other drugsm 0.824 0.003 0.824 0.824 0.050 0.825 0.806
Divorcedmm, yy 0.536 0.004 0.537 0.538 0.058 0.580 0.525
Stopped by police 0.824 0.003 0.824 0.824 0.058 0.826 0.810
Convicted 0.951 0.002 0.951 0.951 0.050 0.951 0.947
Savingmm, yy 0.716 0.034 0.715 0.714 0.097 0.729 0.705
Retirement accountmm, yy 0.523 0.034 0.572 0.570 0.092 0.610 0.559
Missed bill paymentmm, yy 0.787 0.010 0.787 0.787 0.062 0.791 0.769
CC debt, anym 0.531 0.005 0.541 0.537 0.059 0.587 0.533
CC maxed outmm, yy 0.887 0.006 0.887 0.887 0.062 0.889 0.881
Debt to businessesm, yy 0.796 0.005 0.796 0.796 0.058 0.799 0.779
Negative net worthmm, yy 0.885 0.014 0.885 0.885 0.065 0.886 0.877
“Base rate” gives the base rate of the modal class. Efron’s R2 is included for consistency with Study 1. PA, proportion agreement; a., association; p., prediction. m, mm, y, yyLevels are
associated with significantly different month or year patience at the 0.05 level (m and y, uncorrected; mm and yy, Holm-Bonferroni-corrected).
SD; the log model is a quantile regression model predicting
the CV with conditional medians, rather than a least-squares
regression model predicting the CV with conditional means; and
the nominal model uses medians rather than means of the values
in its training set.
As can be seen in Table 8, the log model’s strength of
association always exceeds the MAD, but the improvement is
very small (e.g., there is a difference of 29 s of weekend sleep).
Proportional to the MAD, the largest difference is for net family
income, $993, but this is still not much predictive accuracy
given a MAD of $44,000. On the predictive side, the log model
fails to beat the MAD for most of the CVs (5 of 8). The
best MAD-proportional improvement is again for income, this
time a slightly smaller $881. The nominal model achieves better
association than the log model (including a $3,168 improvement
from the MAD for income), but this again seems to be due to
overfitting: the nominal model’s predictive accuracy is inferior to
the log model’s for all CVs.
The overall picture is similar to that of Study 1: the available
measures of time preferences cannot predict the available CVs
with more than trivial accuracy (except, perhaps, in the case
of retirement savings). Weak association under the log models
is no doubt related to this; however, our findings for the
nominalmodels exemplify the fact that stronger association is not
sufficient for predictive accuracy.
4. GENERAL DISCUSSION
We assessed how accurately several tests of time preferences,
comprising both patience and nonstationarity, could predict
a variety of CVs. Study 1, using 181 users of Mechanical
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TABLE 8 | Results for continuous criterion variables in Study 2.
MAD Log model Nominal model
MAE, a. MAE, p. MAE, a. MAE, p.
Exercise, light, min/y 25,940.94 25,921.10 25,940.86 25,427.31 26,886.97
Exercise, vigorous, min/y 22,205.79 22,173.85 22,197.58 21,730.30 23,316.54
Sleep min, weekday 63.32 63.18 63.46 60.37 66.33
Sleep min, weekend 73.66 73.18 73.34 69.09 76.23
Drinks in last month 17.92 17.91 17.95 17.34 18.80
Sexual debutmm, yy 1.91 1.91 1.92 1.83 1.99
Net family incomemm, yy 44,145.32 43,151.85 43,285.46 40,976.40 44,268.49
CC debt, dollarsmm 5,972.24 5,961.44 5,979.99 5,715.25 6,269.98
For ease of interpretation, criterion variables have been transformed back to their original scales. R2, being specific to squared deviation whereas this analysis is in terms of absolute
deviation, is not shown. MAD, mean absolute deviation from the median; MAE, mean absolute error; a., association; p., prediction. mm, yy Kendall correlation with month or year patience
is significant at the 0.05 level (Holm-Bonferroni-corrected).
Turk, 10 CVs, and 3 distinct families of time-preference tests,
found low to zero predictive accuracy. Study 2 replicated this
finding for 7,127 participants in the NLSY79, 40 new CVs
(covering all but one of the content areas of Study 1 as well
as some others), and one new test of time preferences. The
studies complement each other in that Study 1 took special
care to ensure the quality of measurement of time preferences,
whereas Study 2 used a much larger, nationally representative
sample, and considered a richer set of CVs. In Study 1, we
found that the three families of time-preference tests had
decent retest reliability and convergent validity, supporting the
idea that our negative result was not due to poorly chosen
time-preference tests. In Study 2, we found that many of
the relationships between time preferences and the CVs were
significantly nonzero, exemplifying that significance does not
imply predictive accuracy, andwe found that the nominalmodel’s
greater strength of association did not translate into greater
predictive accuracy, exemplifying the gap between association
and prediction.
The consistently observed lack of predictive accuracy may be
surprising in light of previous studies. However, as discussed
in the introduction, past studies of time preferences have
generally failed to evaluate predictive accuracy, despite the
intentions of researchers. For, while these and other studies have
found many significant associations between time preferences
and CVs, significance and strength of association are distinct
from predictive accuracy, as discussed in the introduction and
demonstrated in Study 2. Hence, our findings are in no way
inconsistent with these many previous findings. The difference,
rather, is that we have specifically examined what many
past studies might be thought to have examined—predictive
accuracy—but did not.
Our finding of no predictive accuracy, which supports and
strengthens the negative claim of Chabris et al. (2008), is
important for the future study of real-world self-control behavior.
It suggests that, regardless of the explanatory or descriptive
merits of intertemporal-choice theory, time-preference tests
are not useful—at least all on their own—for predicting such
behavior. Researchers who wish to predict overeating, drug use,
and debt accumulation should seek other variables to augment, if
not replace, time preferences.
What can be made of Study 1’s findings concerning reliability
and convergent validity? They are useful as reassurance that
we did not choose particularly poor tests, to which subjects
responded mostly randomly. Arfer and Luhmann (2015) likewise
showed that laboratory tests of time preferences can predict
each other very accurately. It follows that the lack of predictive
accuracy for CVs cannot be attributed solely to noise in
the measurement of preferences or temporal instability in
preferences.
Since nonstationarity plays an important role in economic
thinking on self-control, but has been somewhat neglected in
behavioral research on intertemporal choice, we took special
care to include it in our tests. Not only did this not suffice
for predictive accuracy for CVs, we found that preference tests
could predict variations of themselves with different front-end
delays just as well as they could predict themselves unaltered.
This finding suggests there is little value inmeasuring stationarity
separately from patience, supporting the usual practice of
measuring only patience.
4.1. Limitations and Future Directions
Our conclusions are qualified by the limitations of our methods
and the scope of our study. First, in terms of independent
variables, we concerned ourselves exclusively with abstract time
preferences. Even if time preferences are not predictively useful
on their own, perhaps they have predictively useful interactions
with other variables. Unfortunately, because there is no limit to
the number and diversity of other independent variables that
might be considered, there is no real way to falsify this idea.
Another avenue we did not explore is measures of intertemporal
choice that consider a domain other than money or that match
the context of test-taking to the context of the behavior of
interest. What is perhaps the most famous patience test uses
marshmallows rather than money (Mischel et al., 1989). It
is known that patience tests in which the reward is health
(Chapman, 1996), sex (Johnson and Bruner, 2012), or percentage
of a job offer spent on interesting tasks (Schoenfelder and
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Hantula, 2003) tend not to be strongly related to patience
for money. And pathological gamblers are less patient when
tested in an off-track betting parlor than when tested in neutral
settings (Dixon et al., 2006). Perhaps domain- or context-specific
tests of intertemporal choice will prove more predictively useful
than generic time-preference tests. We may be able to predict
obesity more accurately by asking for intertemporal choices
about cookies in a kitchen than about money in a laboratory. This
said, the bulk of existing research on intertemporal choice and
its relation to criterion variables has, like our study, considered
only intertemporal choice for money. So to the degree that this
limitation applies to our own study, it applies to most of the
existing literature as well.
All our measures of time preferences had subjects give
judgments about hypothetical rather than real scenarios, which
may seem questionable. However, past research contrasting real
and hypothetical rewards has found no effect on time preferences
(e.g., Johnson and Bickel, 2002; Madden et al., 2003, 2004;
Lagorio and Madden, 2005). In a similar vein, our CVs were
self-reported, which was consistent with many past studies. Self-
report allowed us to include 50 different CVs across the two
studies, but their reliability and accuracy may have been impaired
by phenomena such as self-presentation concerns and subjects’
imperfectmemory for how often they exercise.We can at least say
that unlike many self-report measures in psychological research,
our CVs asked about objective phenomena (such as minutes of
sleep) rather than requiring explicitly subjective judgments (such
as how happy one feels), reducing the variability in how subjects
could interpret and answer our questions.
Finally, in Study 1, we cannot know 1-month retest reliabilities
among the many subjects who did not return for session 2. Our
return rate, at 52%, was less than the 60% obtained in another
retest-reliability study on Mechanical Turk by Buhrmester et al.
(2011), but greater than the 28% obtained in the in-person
retest-reliability study of Meier and Sprenger (2015).
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